Abstract. The paper discusses the problem of modelling linguistic uncertainty, which is the uncertainty produced by statements in natural language. For example, the vague statement Mary is young' produces uncertainty about Mary's age. We concentrate on simple a rmative statements of the type`subject is predicate', where the predicate satis es a special condition called monotonicity. For this case, we model linguistic uncertainty in terms of upper probabilities, which are given a behavioural interpretation as betting rates. Possibility measures and probability measures are special types of upper probability measure. We evaluate Zadeh's suggestion that possibility measures should be used to model linguistic uncertainty and the Bayesian claim that probability measures should be used. Our main conclusion is that, when the predicate is monotonic, possibility measures are appropriate models for linguistic uncertainty. We also discuss several assessment strategies for constructing a numerical model.
Introduction
Information is commonly transmitted through statements in natural language. The statement Mary is young', for instance, provides partial information about Mary's age. If initially we know nothing about Mary's age and we subsequently hear that she is young, our knowledge about her age has increased, although we remain uncertain about her exact age. In this paper we are concerned with the information conveyed by statements in natural language, which we call linguistic information. Linguistic information often involves vague predicates such as`young'. We will restrict our discussion to simple a rmative statements of the type`subject is predicate' or`subject satis es property'.
The linguistic information`Mary is young' produces some uncertainty about Mary's age; it seems likely that Mary is younger than 30 years, but we cannot be certain about that. We will call this type of uncertainty linguistic uncertainty. In general, linguistic uncertainty is the uncertainty about a precisely de ned quantity that is produced by linguistic information. The problem considered in this paper is how best to model linguistic uncertainty. In this problem, our uncertainty is due to a lack of knowledge, and not to some physical randomness or indeterminacy. Our model for linguistic uncertainty will therefore be epistemic rather than physical (see 42] for a discussion of this distinction).
Why is this important? For one thing, linguistic uncertainty is very common and it is natural from a scienti c or a philosophical point of view to attempt to model it. Another reason is more practical. Human actions are very often based on linguistic information. In order to design systems that emulate, \mechanise" or improve what humans do, it is therefore useful to be able to model this kind of information. For instance, many of the production rules in expert systems are expressed in natural language and contain vague predicates; see 16, 55] for many examples. To combine such rules and to draw inferences or make decisions from them, it is necessary to model the linguistic uncertainty they produce.
To formalise the problem, we consider a possibility space , which is the set of possible values for some well de ned but uncertain state W. Here W is a property of a subject . Let q denote another property of which is in some way related to W, in the sense that knowing` is q' provides some information about the value of W (the actual state). With this notation, we can state the problem of modelling linguistic uncertainty that is discussed in the rest of the paper:
what is an appropriate mathematical model for the uncertainty about the value of W that is produced by the linguistic information` is q'?
In the example of Mary's age, denotes the subject Mary, W denotes Mary's unknown age in years, may be taken to be the interval (0; 120), and q denotes the vague predicate`young'.
The problem is to model the uncertainty about Mary's age that results from the informatioǹ Mary is young'.
In another example, we are trying to identify the person who committed a crime from amongst a group of suspects. An eyewitness has told us, for instance, that the criminal is tall. Here and W both refer to the criminal, is the set of suspects, q =`tall' and` is q' is the eyewitness's description of the criminal.
Or suppose a meteorologist has told us that there is a high probability of rain tomorrow. Here and W denote the probability of rain tomorrow, = 0; 1], and q =`high'. Instead of`high', the meteorologist might have used any other vague description of the probability, such as`close to one' or`about 50 percent'.
In addition to the linguistic information` is q', there may be some relevant background knowledge about . This might tell us, for example, that Mary is a human rather than a cat, or that Mary is applying for a particular type of job. However, we assume that the background knowledge by itself tells us little or nothing about the unknown state W, except that the actual value of W belongs to the set ; the background knowledge may help us to identify an appropriate possibility space.
The properties or predicates q we consider in this paper may be either clear or vague. A property is said to be clear if, for all in , either clearly satis es q or clearly does not satisfy q. A property q is called vague if it is not clear, i.e. if there are objects in for which it is unclear whether they satisfy q, or in other words, if its extension has inexactly de ned boundaries. Typical examples are`tall',`young',`bald',`a heap' 1 .
The most commonly held view is that there are objects which satisfy a vague property only partially, or to a certain degree. This means that some propositions are only partially true. This assumption underlies a number of modern mathematical and logical theories which try to deal with vagueness, such as fuzzy logic 51, 52] and certain branches of many-valued logic 37]. Supervaluationism 15, 17, 28] , on the other hand, abandons the idea of partial truth in favour of supertruth, that is, truth on all admissible valuations. An admissible valuation can be informally described as a possible explication of a vague predicate that turns it into a clear predicate but is compatible with the meaning of the vague predicate. There is still another current of thought, called epistemicism, which denies that properties can be partially satis ed or that there is such a thing as partial truth: any object either satis es a vague property or it does not, but for some objects it is unknown which of the two cases actually obtains. For a discussion of these issues, we refer to a recent book by Timothy Williamson 47] . In this paper, we take the rst view 2 and assume that a vague property may be satis ed to a certain degree. 1 Alternatively, a property is vague when it can be used to construct a so-called sorites paradox, a term derived from the Greek word ! o& for heap 47]. 2 We have discovered that similar conclusions about the usefulness of possibilistic models can be reached on the other views. We intend to publish a discussion of these issues elsewhere.
We want to emphasise that our main concern is not with modelling vagueness, but rather with modelling the uncertainty produced by linguistic information of the type`subject is predicate', where the predicate may be either vague or clear. Nevertheless, vagueness seems to be a controversial topic in some circles, so it may be useful to clarify our view here. We think that vagueness is an important feature of natural language: a little observation will show that vague predicates are used extremely often in normal, everyday human communication. The ubiquity of vagueness in natural language makes it an important subject of study in any philosophy of language, and this has been recognised by numerous philosophers and logicians. Some examples are 1, 15, 17, 21, 36, 39, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52] ; see 47] for more information and a detailed historical overview.
We also think that vagueness cannot be eliminated from statements in natural language without appreciably changing their meaning. Consider the example of an expert system assisting a personnel department in their search for a new sales manager. One of the rules the builders of such an expert system might want to implement is:`if the candidate is too old, he or she is not suited for the job'. Here`too old' is vague, and the question arises how we can model such a rule.
There is no precise age at which a candidate changes from being not too old to being too old, as is required in any clear de nition of`too old'. Rather, there is a smooth and gradual transition over a range of ages, perhaps from around 40 (which is not too old) to around 50 (which is too old). Across this range, the degree of suitability of a candidate for the job decreases smoothly as age increases. The rule establishes a nonincreasing link between the age of the candidate and his or her degree of suitability. We could try to make the rule clear by making the predicate`too old' clear; we could replace it by, say,`older than 45', and thus get`if the candidate is older than 45, then he or she is not suited for the job'. But this new rule no longer has the same meaning as the rst one, and the link that it establishes between age and the candidate's suitability is a travesty of the intended one.
According to some \pragmaticists" 27], a vague term should be made clear by giving it an operational de nition. Thus, the vague term`young' might be de ned in a legal context as`not older than 18'. In this way, adopting clear operational de nitions can eliminate vagueness from our discourse. But this is not always possible and very often it is not useful. Consider the example of an eyewitness to a petty theft, who has seen the culprit and describes him as young and badly dressed. Would she necessarily be willing to a rm that he was not older than 18? She might be willing to state that he was de nitely older than 15 and de nitely not older than 30, but be unable to be more precise. Insisting on an operational de nition of`young' as`not older than 18' would then result in the elimination of this part of the eyewitness's report from the evidence, because she cannot say whether or not the thief was older than 18. What she could do at best is give clear bounds such as 15 and 30. But is this the same as what she meant when she said`young'? Does it re ect all the information that she wanted to convey by saying young'?
We cannot always make our vague statements clear without changing their meaning. In any case, the information that we have is often vague. Our task therefore is to model the uncertainty produced by this kind of information.
In order to model linguistic uncertainty, several questions need to be considered. Firstly, what kind of mathematical model should be used to model the uncertainty that is produced by vague statements, and how should the model be interpreted? We want a mathematical model for linguistic uncertainty to be both meaningful and useful. This means that the mathematical terms which appear in the model must have a practical interpretation. Moreover, since humans often rely on linguistic information as a basis for choosing between actions, we want to be able to use the model to make decisions. For these reasons, we investigate using upper probabilities, which have a behavioural interpretation in terms of betting rates and other decisions, as models for linguistic uncertainty 3 . Possibility measures and probability measures, which have been previously proposed as models for linguistic uncertainty, are special types of upper probability measure. These issues are addressed in Section 2.
Secondly, are there reasons why linguistic uncertainty should be modelled by a possibility measure, as Zadeh has suggested 56]? In Sections 2{4, we argue that this suggestion makes very good sense for clear properties, and also for a special class of vague properties which we call monotonic. The case of nonmonotonic properties is brie y discussed in Section 6.
Thirdly, how can we make the numerical assessments that are needed to construct a possibility measure or another numerical model? This problem is discussed in Section 5.
Finally, how should we combine the information provided by several vague statements? If the separate statements each generate a possibility measure, should the combination do so? These last questions are important but they will be deferred to another paper.
2. Possibility measures, probability measures and upper probabilities Lot Zadeh was one of the rst to argue that the standard theory of probability is not very well suited for modelling linguistic uncertainty. In 53, 56] he proposed an alternative model which he called a possibility measure, and which is based on his earlier notion of a fuzzy set 51]. Here we summarise the main ideas of his approach.
A possibility measure on is a mapping from the power set of to 0; 1], with the properties that (;) = 0 and the degree of possibility of a union of sets is the supremum of their degrees of possibility: for any family fA j : j 2 Jg of subsets of , ( Zadeh proposed that the linguistic uncertainty produced by a vague statement` is q' should be modelled by a possibility measure q on , or by the associated possibility distribution q . Other models of linguistic uncertainty in a purely ordinal context, where this behavioural interpretation is not considered, can be found in 4, 5] . Some of the ideas considered here, such as the plausibility orderings discussed in Section 3, also play a role in these ordinal models. 8, 22] . Good overviews can be found in 11, 14] . An interesting behavioural and decisiontheoretic interpretation of membership functions is due to Giles 19] , who associates membership degrees with net utility received for making typical assertions.
In order to evaluate the claim that possibility measures are appropriate models for linguistic uncertainty, it is necessary to adopt a speci c interpretation of possibility measures. In this paper we will adopt a behavioural interpretation of possibility measures as upper probabilities, which seems to have been rst suggested by Giles 18] . Essentially, an upper probability assessment is regarded as a commitment to act in certain ways. This kind of behavioural interpretation is especially useful for relating possibility measures to decision making and for guiding the numerical assessments that are needed to specify a possibility measure.
An upper probability measure on is a mapping from the power set of to 0; 1]. When A is a subset of , P(A) is called the upper probability of A. We interpret P (A) as an in mum acceptable betting rate for betting against the occurrence of A. More speci cally, a person's assessment of P(A) is interpreted as a commitment to bet against A at any betting rate greater than P (A). That is, if I A denotes the indicator function of A and x > P(A), the person is committed to accept the bet whose reward is x ? I A , and the bet with reward P(A) ? I A is marginally acceptable. When P is a coherent upper probability measure on , it must satisfy the inequalities, for all subsets A and B of , maxfP(A); P(B)g P(A B) P(A) + P (B): Both inequalities can be justi ed through the betting argument that was used to justify the general condition of coherence. For example, the second inequality can be justi ed by noting that a bet against A B at betting rate P (A) + P (B) produces the uncertain reward P(A) + P(B) ? I A B , which is certain to be at least as large as P(A) ? I A ] + P (B) ? I B ], the net reward from the combination of marginally acceptable bets against A and against B. Hence the betting rate P(A) + P (B) is, in e ect, an acceptable rate for betting against A B, and it is therefore an upper bound for the in mum acceptable betting rate P(A B). In fact probability measures achieve the upper bound P (A B) = P (A) + P (B) for all disjoint subsets A and B, whereas possibility measures achieve the lower bound P (A B) = maxfP(A); P(B)g for all subsets A and B.
Every normal possibility measure on is a coherent upper probability measure. It can therefore be given the behavioural interpretation of upper probabilities. That is, (A) is interpreted as an in mum acceptable betting rate for betting against A. For example, (A) = 0:5 is interpreted as a commitment to bet against A whenever the betting rate is greater than 0.5, i.e. whenever the gain if A does not occur is greater than the loss if A occurs.
Also, every probability measure is a coherent upper probability measure, and the behavioural interpretation of upper probabilities agrees in this case with the usual Bayesian interpretation of probabilities as two-sided betting rates. A ( nitely additive) probability measure P on is a mapping from the power set of to 0; 1], with the properties P( ) = 1 and P(A B) = P(A)+P(B) whenever A and B are disjoint subsets of . Like possibility measures, probability measures are set functions, de ned on all subsets of . Usually a probability measure can be characterised in terms of a point function on (a probability mass function or probability density function), which is analogous to a possibility distribution. The behavioural interpretation of P(A) is that it is an in mum acceptable betting rate for betting against A. Because of the property P(A) = 1 ? P(A c ), where A c denotes the set-theoretic complement of A, P(A) can also be interpreted as a supremum acceptable betting rate for betting on A. In this case P(A) is a`fair' or`two-sided' betting rate.
So the class of upper probability measures includes all possibility and probability measures, as well as a range of intermediate models. Both possibility measures and probability measures are extreme types of upper probability measure. For every subset A of , probability measures satisfy P(A) + P (A c ) = 1, whereas possibility measures satisfy: either P(A) = 1 or P (A c ) = 1.
We have argued elsewhere 42, 44] that coherent upper probability measures, and their generalisation to upper and lower previsions, are su ciently exible and general to model a very wide variety of types of uncertainty. As we have mentioned, possibility measures and probability measures are special types of coherent upper probability measure. So too are the 2-alternating Choquet capacities. Moreover, the belief functions used in the Dempster-Shafer theory are a special type of coherent lower probability 44].
We assume here that linguistic uncertainty can be modelled by upper probability measures, and we shall consider whether these should have the special properties of possibility or probability measures. There has been a vigorous debate between possibility theorists and Bayesians 2, 10, 56] about whether linguistic uncertainty should be modelled by possibility measures or by probability measures. Our model encompasses both these alternatives and it therefore provides a more general framework in which the two approaches can be compared.
Some Bayesians have claimed that all types of uncertainty, including linguistic uncertainty, can be modelled adequately by probability measures, and therefore that possibility measures and other types of upper probabilities are not required 2, 29, 30]. To evaluate this claim, consider the linguistic uncertainty produced by the statement` is q', and suppose rst that q is a clear property. For example, if a newspaper reports the amount of rainfall in Maleny in August as less than 50 mm', how should we model our uncertainty about the exact rainfall? Let A q = f 2 : satis es qg be the extension of q. Then the information` is q' is equivalent to`W 2 A q '. This does not provide any information to di erentiate between the elements of A q . Bayesians might argue that there is always substantial background knowledge or contextual information which enables us to construct a probability distribution on A q . For example, if we had su ciently detailed knowledge about the frequency distribution of rainfall in Maleny in August, from previous years in which the rainfall was less than 50 mm, we would be able to construct a suitable probability distribution for the exact rainfall. But this requires some very specialised knowledge. Of course we should use this knowledge if it is available, and then a probability measure may be a good model, but in most practical applications we do not have this kind of information. If we have no other information about the amount of rainfall, how should we model our uncertainty after learning that it is less than 50 mm?
In the absence of other information, Bayesians might model the uncertainty by using a socalled noninformative probability measure on A q . For instance, if A q were nite, they would assign equal probabilities to all the elements of A q and zero probability to elements outside A q .
In the rainfall example, they might assign a uniform probability density to the interval 0; 50).
However, failure to di erentiate between the elements of A q leads to equal probabilities only if we are forced to compare the probabilities of these elements. Given the information`W 2 A q ', it is more rational not to compare the elements of A q , since we have no information on which to base such comparisons. Refusing to make any comparisons would lead us to use the vacuous upper probability measure relative to A q , which is de ned for all A by P(A) = 1 if A\A q 6 = ; and P(A) = 0 otherwise. This model is equivalent to the probability assessment P(A q ) = 1, which is all that can be deduced from the information`W 2 A q '. Noninformative probability measures, like all other probability measures, have strong behavioural implications. For example, a uniform distribution on 0; 50) for the unknown rainfall implies that we must be willing to bet on or against the rainfall exceeding 30mm at the twosided betting rate 0.4; this seems to re ect very substantial information about the unknown rainfall. The vacuous upper probabilities, on the other hand, have trivial behavioural implications; they imply no commitments whatsoever to bet on or against this event. In that respect, the`noninformative' probability distributions are highly informative, and it is the vacuous upper probabilities that are truly noninformative. Another sign of this is that the vacuous upper probabilities are invariant under reformulation of the possibility space , whereas noninformative probability measures are not. In particular, a uniform probability distribution on a nite space is not invariant under re ning or combining elements of , and a uniform distribution on a continuous space is not invariant under one-to-one transformations. A more thorough discussion of these issues can be found in 43] and in Chapter 5 of 42].
We therefore conclude that, when q is a clear predicate, the linguistic uncertainty produced by` is q' should be modelled by the vacuous upper probability measure relative to A q . This model is a possibility measure on , and its associated possibility distribution is the indicator function of A q . When q is a clear predicate, = I Aq is precisely Zadeh's possibility assignment equation, which he uses to associate a possibility measure with the linguistic information` is q'. In summary, when q is clear, we can corroborate Zadeh's claim that the linguistic uncertainty is best represented by a possibility measure, based on his possibility assignment equation. Now consider the linguistic uncertainty produced by a vague predicate. According to Cheeseman 2], the uncertainty generated by any piece of information, no matter how vague it is, can be represented by a probability measure. Cheeseman discusses, as an example, the vague predicate`probably'. He claims that the information`probably A' can be modelled by a probability density function on the unit interval 0; 1], which represents uncertainty about the true probability of event A. He suggests a particular probability density function which has mean 0.9. The behavioural meaning of this is that Cheeseman, given only the information`probably A', would be willing to bet on or against the occurrence of A at odds of 9 to 1 on. This seems somewhat over-con dent! It illustrates that Bayesian models have strong implications concerning betting rates and other decisions, and that they cannot adequately re ect the imprecision of linguistic information. A better model for`probably A', which does re ect its imprecision, is to take the lower probability of A to be 0.5 and the upper probability to be 1.
Similarly, given the information`Mary is young', Cheeseman 2] models the linguistic uncertainty by a probability density function for Mary's age, which determines a probability measure on the set of possible ages. Again the problem is that any such model has strong behavioural implications which cannot be supported by the vague linguistic information. For example, it implies that, given only that`Mary is young', there is a two-sided betting rate P(A) for the event A that Mary is younger than 25 years. Since we cannot be certain that Mary is or is not younger than 25, we should have 0 < P(A) < 1. According to the Bayesian model, we are committed to bet both on and against A at betting rate P(A). But the information`Mary is young' is perfectly consistent with Mary being younger than 25, and it seems unreasonable that we should be committed, on the basis of just this information, to bet against this event at a nontrivial rate. The statement provides absolutely no evidence against the event. Compare the Bayesian model with the upper probability model de ned in Section 4, for which P (A c ) may be nonzero but P (A) = 1, meaning that we are not committed to bet against A at any nontrivial rate. There may be a wide range of betting rates x such that we are not committed either to bet on or to bet against A at rate x. The imprecision of the upper probability model re ects the vagueness of the information on which it is based.
We conclude that the linguistic uncertainty produced by` is q' cannot be modelled adequately by a probability measure 4 . More general models, such as upper probability measures, are needed, both for clear predicates and for vague predicates. We therefore agree with Zadeh's claim that probability measures are not well suited to model linguistic uncertainty 56]. In the rest of the paper we examine whether possibility measures are suitable models.
Monotonic predicates
We want to model the uncertainty that is produced by the statement` is q', where now we assume that q is a vague predicate. In this section we de ne three special types of predicates, which we call increasing, decreasing and monotonic predicates. For these types of predicates, we will argue that linguistic uncertainty can be modelled by a possibility measure.
Consider again the example of Mary's age, where denotes Mary, the uncertain quantity W denotes Mary's age in years, is the interval (0; 120), and q denotes the vague predicate`young'.
Associated with`young', there is a natural ordering of according to the comparative relatioǹ younger than': when 1 and 2 are any elements of , age 1 is younger than age 2 if and only if 1 < 2 . Alternatively, we may say that age 1 satis es`young' at least as well as age 2 if and only if 1 2 . On this basis we might argue that, given the information`Mary is young', it is more plausible that Mary is aged 20 than that she is aged 25, and generally an age 1 is at least as plausible as 2 if and only if 1 2 . Thus the natural ordering of may be interpreted as a plausibility ordering, and it can be used as the basis for a numerical model; this idea will be developed in Section 4. 4 For other discussions of the Bayesian models, see 10, 13, 23, 25, 48 Many of the predicates which are commonly used in ordinary language are increasing or decreasing for appropriate choices of W. For example,`old' is increasing and`young' is decreasing when W represents an unknown age, and`tall' is increasing and`short' is decreasing when W represents an unknown height. We can identify an increasing or decreasing predicate q by noting that the comparative version of q is represented by the natural ordering > or < of , e.g.`younger' means lower age and`taller' means greater height. Our de nition of increasing and decreasing predicates requires the possibility space to be a numerical scale of measurement for degrees of q-ness. This is a strong restriction, but the de nition can be easily generalised to apply to a much wider range of applications in which there is an underlying numerical scale, not necessarily identical to , for degrees of q-ness. For example, suppose that we are trying to identify the man who committed a particular crime from a group of suspects, who make up the possibility space . An eyewitness describes the criminal as`tall'. How should we model the resulting uncertainty about which suspect is the criminal? Here the possibility space is not a subset of the real line, so`tall' is neither increasing nor decreasing for an uncertain state W which represents the unknown criminal. However, there is a natural ordering of according to the height of the suspects, and`tall' is increasing for an uncertain state which represents the height of the criminal. In other examples, the possibility space is multidimensional, e.g. each possible state in is a vector containing measurements of age, height, weight, etc. Again there is a natural ordering of according to any one of these measurements. The following de nition covers both these cases.
A predicate q is said to be monotonic for W when there is an objective method of measuring the degree of q-ness of each object in , which produces a real-valued measurement q ( ) 5 We could also refer to W as a \variable", but this term may be misleading. In some examples W may be a random variable, so that our uncertainty about its value arises from physical randomness, but more commonly the uncertainty about the value of W is purely epistemic and arises from our incomplete knowledge about the value. For example, we may be uncertain about Mary's age, although her age is certainly not random.
(whose value is known 6 ) such that, for all 1 Thus the monotonic predicates are the predicates q for which there is an underlying numerical scale which measures the degree of q-ness of the objects in . All increasing or decreasing predicates are monotonic. For an increasing predicate q, is a subset of the real line, each element of is itself an objective measurement of degree of q-ness, and q is the identity function. For a decreasing predicate q, q is ?1 times the identity function. For example, height is a measure of degree of tallness, age is a measure of degree of oldness, and ?age is a measure of degree of youngness.
If q is monotonic for W, which takes values in , then q is increasing for the real-valued quantity q (W), which takes values in the possibility space q = f q ( ): 2 g, the set of possible measurements. This allows us to treat a monotonic predicate as an increasing predicate for a transformed variable. In the example of criminal suspects, if q is`tall' then q is a measurement of height and q is the set of heights of all the suspects, which is ordered by .
A monotonic predicate q induces an ordering q of by: 1 q 2 if and only if q ( 1 ) q ( 2 ). The ordering q is complete, re exive and transitive (it is a total preorder). It re ects the relative degrees of q-ness of objects in , and 1 q 2 may be read as`W = 1 satis es q at least as well as W = 2 does', or more simply as` 1 is at least as q as 2 '. If q is increasing then q agrees with , and if q is decreasing then q agrees with . More generally, q models the comparative version of property q. The ordering q is objective or interpersonal (i.e. independent of the modeller's subjective judgement) and independent of the context in which the linguistic information appears.
The ordering q has a crucial role in the argument of Section 4, which supports possibility measures as models for` is q'. In Section 4 we take 1 q 2 to imply that, given the informatioǹ is q', the value W = 1 is at least as plausible as the value W = 2 . We therefore call q the plausibility ordering that is associated with a monotonic predicate q.
These de nitions can be linked to Zadeh's notion of a membership function as follows. Assume that a membership function q for the property q can be de ned on , and q ( ) is interpreted as the degree to which the possible state W = satis es q 51]. Then we should have, for any 1 and 2 in , q ( 1 ) q ( 2 ) , 1 q 2 , q ( 1 ) q ( 2 );
(1) so that q and q should agree up to an order-preserving bijection between their ranges. In the rare cases where an objective membership function q exists and is known, it is reasonable to take q = q . However, in most examples of increasing, decreasing or monotonic predicates, q is subjective and di ers from the measurement function q . For the predicate`old', for instance, there is an objective measurement scale in which q ( ) measures age in years, whereas q ( ) must lie in the interval 0; 1] and is presumably subjective and context dependent. This indicates that assuming that q is a monotonic predicate is considerably weaker than assuming that it has an objective membership function.
In some examples there is a natural ordering q but no underlying numerical scale q . In the example of criminal suspects, for instance, we may be able to tell immediately that suspect 1 is blonder than suspect 2, without having an objective procedure for measuring their degrees of blondness. Or, if there are two suspects for a crime, one is younger and taller than the other, and the criminal is described as`young and tall', then we can order the two suspects even though there is no procedure for measuring the degree to which each is`young and tall'. 6 It is not essential that the measurements q( ) are known precisely, but they must be known precisely enough to determine a complete plausibility ordering q.
In these examples we could de ne a complete plausibility ordering q on , such that 1 q 2 if and only if W = 1 satis es q at least as well as W = 2 does, and use this as the basis for a numerical model. However, we can guarantee that a complete ordering can be constructed only when there is a measurement procedure q ; without it, we may be unable to compare the blondness of the two suspects, or one suspect may be older and taller than the other, so that there is no natural complete ordering.
To summarise, the key property of monotonic predicates q, which will be used in the following sections, is that they induce a complete, re exive and transitive ordering q of . The following discussion therefore relies on: Assumption 1. For the vague predicate q there are degrees of q-ness, and every pair of elements in the possibility space can be compared according to how well they satisfy the property q, i.e. according to their degrees of q-ness.
The plausibility ordering q itself could be used to model the uncertainty about the value of W that is produced by` is q'. This has the advantage of not requiring any further (numerical) assessments, which will be typically subjective and often di cult to make. In some problems the ordering q may be a su ciently informative model.
However, unlike the model de ned in the next section, the ordering q does not have a simple behavioural interpretation, i.e. it is not clear how the relation 1 q 2 should in uence behaviour. One possibility is to interpret q as a comparative probability ordering of the singleton sets. That is, the relation 1 q 2 is interpreted as a commitment to accept a particular gamble G( 1 ; 2 ) which results in a gain of one unit if W = 1 holds, a loss of one unit if W = 2 holds, and no gain or loss in other cases. Under this interpretation, 1 q 2 means that W = 1 is at least as probable as W = 2 . However, the behavioural implications of this interpretation seem to be unacceptably strong. It implies, for example, that given the information`Mary is young', we must judge age 15 to be more probable than age 20, and we must be committed to bet accordingly. The information`Mary is young' does seem to imply that age 15 is more plausible (or`more possible') than age 20, in the sense that it provides stronger evidence against W = 20 than against W = 15, but this is somewhat weaker than saying that age 15 is more probable than age 20. Both ages 15 and 20 may be judged to be highly plausible, and in that case we would not be willing to make a commitment to accept the gamble G (15; 20) .
In any case, no matter how we interpret the ordering q , it is clear that the statement` is q' typically provides more information about the value of W than is re ected in q . For example, the information`Mary is young' indicates that Mary is very likely to be younger than 80 years, whereas the natural ordering tells us only that smaller ages are more plausible than larger ones and tells us nothing about the likely size or magnitude of Mary's age. The meaning of`Mary is young' cannot be fully modelled in terms of the comparative`younger than' 7 .
4. An argument for possibility measures A statement` is q' usually provides more information concerning W than is re ected in the ordering q . For example,`Mary is young' provides strong evidence that Mary's age is not more than 80 years. This can be modelled by assigning a small upper probability to the set of all ages which exceed 80 years.
But why should the extra information be modelled in terms of a possibility measure? One argument was outlined in Example 7 (pp. 38{39) of 44]. The essence of the argument is as follows. Let W denote the uncertain quantity whose value is Mary's age in years. Consider the 7 A similar argument is given by Williamson 47] .
evidence about W that is provided by the statement`Mary is young'. This gives some evidence against the event that W 40, for instance, but it gives no evidence in favour of this event. More generally, if x is a positive real number, there is some evidence against the event W x if x is su ciently large, but there is no evidence in favour of this event for any positive x, because the information`Mary is young' is perfectly consistent with arbitrarily small values of W. In behavioural terms, the linguistic information supports betting against W x at su ciently good odds if x is su ciently large, but it gives no reason to bet on this event for any positive value of x.
We therefore assume that the only e ect of the linguistic information`Mary is young' is to provide positive evidence that Mary's age falls below an upper bound x, for some positive values of x. That is, all the evidence concerning W is evidence against some events of the form W x. This assumption is justi ed by the fact that`young' is a decreasing predicate for age; if there is some evidence against a particular age x then this must also be evidence against every age y > x. Under the behavioural interpretation of upper and lower probabilities, positive evidence in favour of an event should produce a positive lower probability for the event, meaning willingness to bet on the event, and the lower probability should increase as the strength of evidence increases. Similarly, positive evidence against an event should produce an upper probability for the event that is strictly less than one, meaning willingness to bet against the event. This correspondence between evidence and upper or lower probabilities is also a basic idea in Glenn Shafer's theory of evidence 41]. It follows that the linguistic uncertainty concerning Mary's age W can be completely modelled by assessing lower probabilities for events of the form W < x, or, equivalently, upper probabilities for events of the form W x. We will see that assessments of this form produce a normal possibility measure 8 .
The argument in the preceding paragraph can be applied to any decreasing or increasing predicate. Suppose that q is an increasing predicate for the uncertain quantity W which takes values in a possibility space (a subset of the real line), and that we have the linguistic information` is q'. Because q is increasing, we assume that the information` is q' provides positive evidence only against events of the form W x, for some x 2 , and that this can be completely modelled by assessing upper probabilities for these events.
To be speci c, suppose that the linguistic uncertainty about the value of W is modelled by assessing P (W x) for all x 2 X, where X is a subset of . The quantities P (W x) can be regarded as assessments, at the points x 2 X, of an upper cumulative probability distribution function (cdf), de ned by F(x) = P (W x). It is possible that X = , but more commonly it may be feasible to make assessments only for a small number of values of x, so that X is a small nite set. If there is di culty in making numerical assessments of P(W x) or if` is q' is judged to provide little information about W, the assessments of P (W x) could be equal to or arbitrarily close to one.
For example, if W is the unknown quantity whose value is John's height in centimetres and = (0; 250), the predicate`tall' is increasing for W. The linguistic information`John is tall' could be modelled by assessing P(W x) for a few convenient values of x. This might produce assessments such as P (W 150) = 0:01, P(W 170) = 0:5 and P (W 185) = 0:9. Usually these assessments will be subjective and they will depend on the context in which the linguistic information is obtained. If there is contextual information which suggests that John is a young boy, for example, the numerical assessments may be very di erent from those we have just given. Compare this with the natural ordering of , which models the comparative relation`is at least as tall as'. Whereas the numerical assessments that are needed to model the uncertainty 8 The argument is essentially the same if we assess upper probabilities for events of the form W > x rather than W x, provided that the regularity conditions in the proof are modi ed slightly.
produced by`tall' are subjective and context dependent, the natural ordering is objective and independent of context.
Since the quantities P(W x) are upper probabilities and the events W x are nested and nondecreasing in x, it is reasonable to assume that 0 P (W x) 1 for all x 2 X and that P (W x) is nondecreasing in x. We also assume that, if x = sup and x 2 X, then P(W x) = P ( ) = 1.
The upper probability measure that is generated by the assessments of P (W x) for x 2 X can be calculated by applying the technique of natural extension 7, 42, 44] . The natural extension is the greatest (i.e. least-committal) coherent upper probability measure, de ned on all subsets of , which agrees with the assessments P(W x) for all x 2 X. It models the behavioural implications of the assessments.
In this problem the natural extension can be found most easily by rst extending the upper cdf F from X to . The extension is the greatest nondecreasing function which agrees with F (x) = P (W x) at all points x 2 X, and this is given by the formula F(x) = inffP (W z): z 2 X; z xg provided that the in mum is over a nonempty set, and otherwise F(x) = 1. Let A be a nonempty subset of and assume that A contains its supremum value a. The upper probability of A can be calculated by maximising the probability of A with respect to all probability measures on whose cdfs never exceed F . Since F is a nondecreasing function, P(A) is achieved by a probability measure which assigns probability F (a) to fag, and P(A) = F (a) = supfF(z) : z 2 Ag. This formula holds also when A does not contain its supremum value a, provided that F is left-continuous at a. This continuity assumption is discussed in the Appendix; it holds automatically when only nitely many assessments are made.
This argument 9 shows that the upper probability measure P that is generated by the assessments of P(W x) is a normal possibility measure, characterised by the possibility distribution = F. Thus (x) = inffP(W z): z 2 X; z xg provided that the in mum is over a nonempty set, and otherwise (x) = 1. If only nitely many assessments are made, the possibility distribution is a step function which has jumps at the points x 2 X. If P (W x) is assessed for all x 2 then (x) = P(W x) everywhere. For any increasing predicate, the possibility distribution is a nondecreasing function. In a similar way, the linguistic uncertainty produced by a decreasing predicate can be modelled by a normal possibility measure whose possibility distribution is nonincreasing. In this case the basic assessments of P (W x) are equivalent to assessments of a lower cdf F(x) = P(W < x) = 1 ? P(W x).
Next we consider the more general class of monotonic predicates, which includes increasing and decreasing predicates as special cases. The preceding argument can be extended to monotonic predicates by applying it to their associated measurement function. Suppose that q is monotonic for W in , q is the associated measurement function and q is the associated plausibility ordering. Let q = f q ( ): 2 g be the set of possible measurements. Then q is an increasing predicate for the uncertain quantity q (W) which takes values in q , and the preceding argument may be applied.
Let L q ( ) = f 2 : q g = f 2 : q ( ) q ( )g denote the set of possible values of W that satisfy q at most as well as does. Then fL q ( ): 2 g is a collection of nested sets, corresponding to di erent levels of satisfaction of the property q. We make the following assumption. 9 A more detailed proof is given in the Appendix. Assumption 2. The information` is q' provides evidence against events of the form L q ( ), and the resulting uncertainty can be modelled by assessing upper probabilities P (L q ( )) for all 2 , where is a subset of . Since the sets L q ( ) are nested and nondecreasing in q ( ), it is reasonable to assume that P(L q ( )) is nondecreasing in q ( ), and also that 0 P (L q ( )) 1, and P(L q ( )) = 1 when L q ( ) = .
As before, the assessments of P (L q ( )) for 2 generate a normal possibility measure, which is characterised by the possibility distribution ( ) = inffP(L q ( )): 2 ; q ( ) q ( )g provided that the in mum is over a nonempty set, and otherwise ( ) = 1. If P (L q ( )) is assessed for all 2 (so = ) then ( ) = P(L q ( )) everywhere. The possibility distribution almost agrees with the ordering q , in the sense that 1 q 2 (which is equivalent to q ( 1 ) q ( 2 )) implies that ( 1 ) ( 2 ). Thus q re ects increasing degrees of possibility or plausibility.
Again the basic assessments P (L q ( )) can be regarded as assessments of an upper cdf F(x) = P(f 2 : q ( ) xg) at the points x = q ( ), where 2 . The natural extension of these assessments to an upper cdf, F, is related to the possibility distribution through ( ) = F ( q ( )). When in nitely many assessments are made, the argument for possibility measures requires an additional continuity assumption, although even without this assumption natural extension yields an upper probability that satis es P(A B) = maxfP(A); P(B)g for all subsets A and B of (maxitivity), and is therefore very close to being a possibility measure. Assumption 3. The set of measurements at which upper probabilities are assessed, f q ( ): 2 g, is closed, and the upper probability assessments P(L q ( )) vary continuously with the measurements q ( ).
Assumption 3 seems reasonable for many vague properties q. For example, given the information`Mary is young' concerning her age W, we would expect P (W 21) to be quite close to P(W 20), because 21 satis es the vague predicate`young' almost as well as 20, and we would expect P (W x) to approach P(W 20) as x approaches 20. The assumption guarantees that natural extension of the upper probability assessments P (L q ( )) produces a possibility measure, even if the number of assessments is in nite. We give a formal proof, using a slightly weaker continuity condition, in the Appendix.
Because L q ( ) = f 2 : q g, the preceding argument concerning monotonic predicates can be expressed in terms of the ordering q . The argument can therefore be generalised to include all cases where the predicate q induces a complete, re exive and transitive ordering of . In these cases, nitely many assessments of upper probabilities P(L q ( )) again generate a normal possibility measure. When in nitely many assessments are made, they generate a maxitive upper probability, and further regularity conditions are needed to produce a possibility measure. We conclude that, under a behavioural interpretation, normal possibility measures are natural and appropriate models for the linguistic uncertainty conveyed by monotonic predicates. The crucial assumption in our argument is Assumption 2, which says that the uncertainty can be modelled through assessments of upper probabilities on a collection of nested sets; it is the nestedness that leads to a possibility measure.
It appears that, from our behavioural point of view, we can corroborate Zadeh's claim that linguistic uncertainty is best represented by a possibility measure, at least when the uncertainty is associated with a monotonic predicate. But what about Zadeh's other claim, that the possibility distribution should be equal to the membership function? Assume that we have a membership function q : ! 0; 1] associated with the vague property q. As suggested earlier, we could take the measurement function q to agree with q , as in (1). If we also assessed upper probabilities P(L q ( )) = q ( ) for all 2 , we would obtain the possibility distribution = q on . Thus the possibility distribution would agree with the membership function, as required by Zadeh's possibility assignment equation.
Let us examine this argument more critically. First, it assumes that there is a membership function, and that we can take it to agree (up to an order-preserving bijection) with the objective measurement function. We discussed these assumptions in Section 3 when we considered the meaning of (1). But the crucial assumption lies in the required assessments P (L q ( )) = q ( ) for all 2 . The argument supports Zadeh's possibility assignment equation only if these assessments can be justi ed. In our view, it is impossible to settle whether or not such assessments are reasonable until we have a clear interpretation of both and q . At present we have a behavioural interpretation of but no clear interpretation of q , except in the case of clear predicates and apart from the requirement that (1) should hold. It seems that some behavioural interpretation for q will have to be found before we can answer this question. This is outside the scope of this paper, so we must leave the matter unsettled.
There is an interesting class of monotonic predicates which deserves special attention, because it links the ideas in this paper to related ideas in the theory of prototypes and in discussions of similarity 38, 54] . In some cases it is reasonable to assume that with the predicate q we can associate a set E q of prototypical elements, and that the degree of q-ness of an element in can be measured in terms of the distance d( ; E q ) = inf 2Eq d( ; ) between and the prototypical set E q . Here d is a distance function 10 on and d( 1 ; 2 ) is taken to express, in some way, the di erence or dissimilarity between the elements 1 and 2 of . The greater d( ; E q ), the greater the dissimilarity between and the prototypical elements, and the less well satis es q. The distance d( ; E q ) now takes over the role of q , and the set L q ( ) = f 2 : d( ; E q ) d( ; E q )g contains those elements which are less similar to the prototypical set than . As before, it seems reasonable to assume that the information` is q' leads to upper probability assessments P(L q ( )) which vary continuously and nonincreasingly with the distance d( ; E q ) between and the prototypical elements. Again these assessments generate an upper probability model that is a possibility measure, through natural extension.
Consider for instance the statement`the probability that this coin lands heads is close to 1 2 '. Here = 0; 1], and W refer to the unknown probability of the coin landing heads, and q =`close to 1 2 '. The prototypical set is f 1 2 g, and the dissimilarity between two elements x and y of is measured by their Euclidean distance d(x; y) = jx ? yj. This leads to a collection of nested sets L q (x) = 0; x] 1 ? x; 1], 0 x 1 2 . It seems reasonable to assume that the linguistic uncertainty can be modelled by making upper probability assessments of the type P(L q (x)) = f(d(x; 1 2 )) = f(jx ? 1 2 j) for 0 x 1 2 , where f is a continuously nonincreasing function from 0; 1 2 ] to 0; 1] with f(0) = 1. The upper probability measure which is generated by these assessments through natural extension is the normal possibility measure whose distribution is de ned by (x) = f(d(x; 1 2 )) for x 2 0; 1]. For any subset A of , the upper probability is
which is a nonincreasing function of the distance d(A; f 1 2 g) between the set A and the prototypical set f 1 2 g. Some subjective numerical assessments are needed to identify f, which brings us to the next topic.
Numerical assessment strategies
In order to apply the model of the preceding section in any practical problem, it is necessary to make some numerical assessments of upper or lower probabilities or of upper or lower cdfs, or, equivalently, of a possibility distribution. Assessment is a serious problem for any numerical uncertainty model, but it is actually somewhat easier for the approach we have suggested than for other numerical models, for the following reasons.
(a) Only a point function on (the possibility distribution) needs to be assessed, unlike a more general upper probability measure which is a set function. (b) The general shape of the possibility distribution is determined by the fact that is monotone, agreeing with q , i.e. ( 1 ) ( 2 ) whenever 1 q 2 .
(c) For a monotonic predicate q, can be regarded as a function of the real-valued variable q , so that is essentially a nondecreasing function of a single real variable. (d) If assessment is di cult, can be constructed, through natural extension, by making only a few numerical assessments; some assessment methods of this kind are suggested below.
(e) The required assessments of upper probabilities P (L q ( )) could themselves be expressed in natural language, by saying, for example, that L q ( ) is`unlikely' or`very unlikely'
and translating these expressions into upper probability values, e.g. using the translations suggested in 44], p. 49. (f) If` is q' provides little information about W or if numerical assessment is too di cult, the possibility distribution can be close to the vacuous distribution = 1. Nevertheless, it is important to give some guidance concerning numerical assessment. Consider the example`Mary is young'; the same ideas apply to other monotonic predicates. It is necessary to make some numerical assessments of upper probabilities such as P(W 20) = (20) . It is evident that appropriate assessments will depend heavily on our understanding of the speaker and the context in which it is asserted that`Mary is young'. Is Mary a person or a cat? Is the subject of the discussion children, university students or housewives?`Mary is young' will produce very di erent numerical assessments depending on whether Mary is known to be a person or a cat, although the ordering q is the same in these two cases, and it seems impossible to make any numerical assessments that are independent of context. We therefore assume that there is relevant contextual information, but this information by itself tells us little or nothing about the value of W. For example, the contextual information might establish that Mary is a job applicant aged between 20 and 50, giving = 20; 50], but say nothing about the relative plausibilities of ages in this range. Of course any contextual information which provides nonnegligible information about the value of W, e.g. by indicating that Mary is a university student, may need to be modelled separately.
Natural languages are complex and there may be many linguistic clues which help us to interpret a vague statement like`Mary is young'. It seems impossible to formalise these clues, especially as some of them may be intuitive or nonverbal, e.g. the tone of voice, emphasis, expression or gestures of the speaker. Consequently numerical assessment must be, ultimately, subjective and context dependent; my assessments must rely on my subjective knowledge and interpretation of the speaker.
We have two suggestions which may be helpful in making numerical assessments. The rst suggestion is to consider useful ways of making the assessments; these are called assessment strategies in 42] . The idea of assessing a possibility distribution, or, equivalently, an upper cdf, is already a kind of partial assessment strategy because it tells us what type of upper probabilities need to be assessed. Here are some more speci c ways of making the assessments. To illustrate the methods, we use the example of the decreasing predicate`young', for which is a subset of the positive real numbers.
1. Assess two numbers ! and !, such that it is entirely plausible that W !, i.e. this event has upper probability 1, and it is practically certain that W < !, i.e. the event W ! has upper probability 0. Here ! should be chosen to be as large as possible and ! as small A small lled circle denotes an assessment (x j ; (x j )).
interpolation. This produces a possibility distribution of the form shown in Figure 1 . This is a simple but rather crude method of assessment. It may be di cult to make a useful assessment of !, as it is dangerous to assign upper probability zero to a possible event. 2. Choose a suitable grid of values x 1 < x 2 < : : : < x n , with each x j 2 , and assess (x j ) = P(L q (x j )) for j = 1; : : : ; n. This xes n values of . There are several ways of interpolating: (a) interpolate using natural extension; (b) interpolate linearly; (c) draw a smooth curve through the points. Natural extension is the most appropriate method of interpolation under the behavioural interpretation of upper probabilities, because it does not add any information to that contained in the n numerical assessments. It produces a possibility distribution which is a step function with jumps at the points x j , such as the one depicted in Figure 2 . 3. Similarly to method 2, but choose a grid of values 1 < 2 < : : : < n and assess x j such that (x j ) = j . For example, take j = j n+1 . Again this produces a step function with jumps at the values x j . Methods 2 and 3 can be used for any monotonic predicate.
4. Choose a standard, monotonic functional form for which involves a few variable parameters, and assess su ciently many upper or lower probabilities to uniquely determine the parameters. It was shown in Section 4 that, for a monotonic predicate q, the possibility distribution is essentially an upper or lower cdf: = F when q is increasing and = 1?F when q is decreasing.
This suggests choosing to be a cdf, or one minus a cdf, from a standard family of probability distributions. Two of the earlier suggestions have this form: the function ( ) = exp(? 2 ) is one minus the cdf of a Rayleigh distribution, and the possibility distribution de ned by method 1 is one minus the cdf of a uniform probability distribution on (!; !). In the case where is the set of positive real numbers, could be chosen from the family of Weibull cdfs F( ) = 1?exp(? ) (where > 0 and > 0), which includes both the Rayleigh family ( = 2) and the exponential family ( = 1), or the families of gamma distributions or F-distributions. When is the set of all real numbers, could be chosen from the family of normal (Gaussian) cdfs, or, more simply, None of these methods eliminates the need for subjective numerical assessments. They merely direct attention to particular types of assessments and perhaps reduce the number of assessments that are needed. Our second suggestion is aimed at eliminating subjective assessments. As we have emphasised, vague terms like`young' are highly context dependent and require subjective input to interpret complex contextual signals. However, it may be possible to de ne a standard translation for`young' which can be used in a narrowly de ned context, such as a particular expert system. By de nition, an expert system is concerned with a rather narrow domain of application, which may restrict the possible meanings of vague predicates which occur in the domain.
Consider, for example, an expert system that is designed to screen the applicants for a particular type of job. The user of the system would enter details about the applicant, obtained from an initial interview, which the system would process to determine whether the applicant should be rejected immediately or recalled for a further interview. To save time, many of the details could be given in the form of vague predicates, such as`the applicant is young, tall, badly dressed and clever'. Now it may be convenient to process this qualitative information in a purely qualitative way, but it is conceivable that some variables, such as intelligence, are su ciently important to model quantitatively, on a real number scale, even though they cannot be measured easily and are assessed through vague judgements such as`clever',`stupid' or`imaginative'. It may be possible, in the narrowly de ned context of applicants for this particular type of job and standard methods of assessment, and perhaps a small homogeneous group of interviewers, to determine standard possibility distributions for common descriptions such as`young',`clever' or`stupid'.
Consider the term`young' as an example. One would carefully question the domain experts (the interviewers) to determine what they mean by`young', by getting them to construct possibility distributions for the uncertain age W, based only on the information`the applicant is young', using the assessment strategies described earlier. One would then form an upper envelope of these possibility distributions, which would encompass the meanings of`young' for all the experts. If the experts disagreed about the meaning, or if the meaning varied greatly according to context, the resulting upper envelope would be close to vacuous and perhaps useless. In these cases, subjective assessments would be unavoidable. However, if there was su cient interpersonal agreement and meaning was more or less independent of context, then a useful translation might be obtained, and this could be applied to future applicants without the need for any further numerical assessment. Of course some discussion between the experts to standardise their terminology is desirable and would tend to produce a smaller possibility distribution, i.e. a more informative and more useful model.
Both these suggestions have their di culties. It is di cult and time consuming to make careful subjective assessments, and it is di cult to agree on the meaning of vague terms. We believe that it may often be necessary to use standard translations for vague predicates, because it is impracticable to make subjective assessments for every occurrence of a predicate, even in simple applications. It may require considerable time and e ort to formulate standard translations, but this may be worthwhile in expert systems which are used repeatedly.
Nonmonotonic predicates
The argument for possibility measures in Section 4 applies to monotonic predicates, and it relies essentially on the existence of a natural ordering q which is complete. It is the completeness property that produces a system of nested sets and hence a possibility measure. For nonmonotonic predicates, there is no reason to expect completeness and the argument breaks down. We can still attempt to construct a complete ordering and a possibility measure, but it is no longer clear that this assessment strategy is preferable to other strategies or that a possibility measure is the most appropriate model.
To illustrate this, consider the uncertainty produced by the statement`Mary is middle-aged' where is the set of possible ages (in years) for Mary.`Middle-aged' is a particular type of nonmonotonic predicate which may be described as unimodal, in the sense that the plausibility of age may be taken to be a nondecreasing function of for values of smaller than some o and a nonincreasing function of for > o .
One way to model the linguistic uncertainty is to construct a complete ordering of and apply the assessment method of Section 4. For example, we might rst identify an interval of prototypical ages which perfectly satisfy`middle-aged', say the interval 45; 55] , and compare any two elements of according to their distance from the prototypical set, i.e. 1 q 2 if and only if 1 is at least as close as 2 to 45; 55] . This produces a complete ordering q . We may then assess upper probabilities for the nested sets L q ( ) as in Section 4, to obtain a possibility distribution such as the one shown in Figure 4 . Ages 40 and 60 are equally middle-aged according to this model, but this comparison is based on a particular choice of distance function and is not inherent in the meaning of`middle-aged'. The distance function, and hence the ordering q , is subjective and quite di cult to construct 11 . Some ages appear to be incomparable in`degree of middle-agedness'. Because of this, it is no longer clear that a possibility distribution is the most appropriate model.
For monotonic predicates, the ordering q is complete, objective and independent of the context in which the linguistic information is obtained. But for nonmonotonic predicates, q may be only a partial ordering, and may depend on both the modeller's subjective judgement and the context. Whether`middle-aged' refers to a man or to a horse depends on the context, and these two cases will produce di erent orderings q ; age 40 is more plausible than age 20 for a middle-aged man, but 20 is more plausible than 40 for a middle-aged horse. Compare with a monotonic predicate q, such as`young', for which the ordering is implicit in the meaning of q and does not depend on context; the ordering is the same for a young horse as for a young man.
Because it is di cult to compare ages such as 40 and 60 which are on di erent sides of the prototypical set, we could try to base a model on a partial ordering which does not make any such comparisons. Suppose that, as in the rst model, we take 45; 55] to be the set of ages which are fully`middle-aged', we construct a partial ordering q by taking 1 q 2 whenever 2 1 55 or 45 1 2 , but now no comparison is made between 1 and 2 when they lie on di erent sides of the interval 45; 55]. As in Section 4, we can construct an upper probability model by assessing upper probabilities for sets of the form L q (x) = f 2 : x q g and also setting P (W 45) = P(W 55) = 1.
Because q is not a complete order, the sets L q (x) do not form a nested system, and this method does not produce a possibility measure. However, it does produce a simple type of coherent upper probability measure which is characterised by its upper and lower cdfs: assessments of P(L q (x)) for x < 45 determine an upper cdf, and assessments of 1 ? P(L q (x)) for x > 55 determine a lower cdf. Upper and lower cdfs resulting from this procedure are shown in Figure 5 12 . Under this model, the upper probability of any set A can be found by maximising its probability P(A) over all probability measures P whose cdf lies between the upper and lower cdfs. For the assessments shown in Figure 5 , when A 1 = (35; 40) and A 2 = (60; 65) we nd that P(A 1 ) = P (A 2 ) = 0:5 and P (A 1 A 2 ) = 1. Since P (A 1 A 2 ) 6 = maxfP(A 1 ); P(A 2 )g, P is not a possibility measure. Nor is it a probability measure. In fact the upper probability model P 2 shown in Figure 5 is less precise than the model P 1 shown in Figure 4 , i.e. P 1 (A) P 2 (A) for all A , with strict inequality for some A. In other words, the model P 2 is even further than the possibility measure P 1 from being a probability measure.
The second model illustrates a more general assessment strategy, based on an ordering q that may be incomplete, which produces a coherent upper probability measure that is not necessarily a possibility measure. We are not suggesting that the second type of model is necessarily better than the rst, but merely that the argument in favour of the rst type of model is not as convincing for nonmonotonic predicates as it is for monotonic predicates. In the case 11 Compare this with the earlier example of the coin at the end of Section 4. In that case, it is natural to take a symmetric distance function, because both and the linguistic information are symmetric about 1 2 . This makes it possible and natural to compare elements on both sides of 1 2 .
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The same type of model is also produced by interpreting`middle-aged' to mean`not young and not old', modelling`not young' (which is an increasing predicate) by a possibility distribution which is an upper cdf, and modelling`not old' (which is a decreasing predicate) by a possibility distribution which is 1 minus a lower cdf. Together, the upper and lower cdfs can be used to model the combined predicate`not young and not old'. This also illustrates that possibility measures may not be the most appropriate model for compound predicates that are formed by combining several monotonic predicates. of nonmonotonic predicates, we do not know of any strong reasons why linguistic uncertainty should be modelled by a possibility measure.
Conclusion
Our results show that it is possible to formulate behavioural models for linguistic uncertainty in terms of upper probability measures. Our argument also indicates that possibility measures are suitable models for the uncertainty produced by the statement` is q', in the two simple cases where q is a clear predicate or a monotonic vague predicate. For nonmonotonic vague predicates, the argument for possibility measures is no longer convincing. Upper probability models can be constructed through a more general assessment strategy, based on an ordering q which may be incomplete together with assessments of upper probabilities for sets of the form L q ( ) = f 2 : q g. This produces a coherent upper probability model for linguistic uncertainty that is not necessarily a possibility measure. These results shed some light on the debate between possibility theorists and Bayesians about how to model linguistic uncertainty 2, 10, 56]. Although our behavioural interpretation of upper probabilities as marginally acceptable betting rates is much closer to the Bayesian interpretation than to Zadeh's, our conclusions suggest that Zadeh is much closer than the Bayesians to being right. At least in the case of a monotonic property, it is natural to model the linguistic uncertainty by assessing upper probabilities for a collection of nested sets, which represent di erent levels of satisfaction of the property. This assessment method generates a possibility measure rather than a probability measure as a model for linguistic uncertainty. This paper has been concerned with simple a rmative sentences of the form` is q', and we have not attempted to model the linguistic uncertainty produced by more complicated statements. In particular, we need to model negative statements (`It is not true that Mary is young'), statements with a quali ed predicate (`Mary is very young'), quali ed statements 13 (`It is likely that Mary is young'), and conditional statements (`If Mary is very young then it is unlikely that she is tall'). Also, compound statements can be formed by combining simple statements, using disjunction (`Mary is either young or middle-aged') or conjunction (`Mary is both young and mature').
The problem of combining information using the conjunction`and' is especially common. As a simple example, might be a set of suspects for a crime in which the criminal is described as young and tall', and we know the age and height of each suspect. We could model the predicates 13 See p. 42 of 44] for one way of modelling quali ed statements. young' and`tall' by separate possibility distributions on . The problem is to combine the two possibility distributions to form an overall model for the uncertainty about which suspect is the criminal.
Some ideas on these problems will be presented elsewhere. It appears that possibility measures are suitable models for some, but not all, of these more complicated types of linguistic information; in some cases, other types of coherent upper probability measures are needed. from below, meaning that Q A (A) = Q A (C a ) = 1 and Q A (C x ) = 0 for all x < a 14 . Here a may be in nite. Now let P A be a convex combination of Q A and Q , with weights (a) and 1? (a) respectively. Then P A is a nitely additive probability measure on , and its cdf F A (x) = P A (C x ) satis es F A (x) = 0 when x < a, F A (x) = (a) when a x < sup , and F A (x) = 1 when x sup . Using assumptions 1{3, it is easy to verify that P A (C x ) = F A (x) u(x) for all x in X.
Because u dominates the probability measure P A on X, it follows from results in Chapter 3 of 42] that the assessments fu(x): x 2 Xg avoid sure loss, and that their natural extension P has the following properties.
(a) P is a coherent upper probability measure on (b) P(C x ) u(x) for all x in X (c) if P is any nitely additive probability measure on such that P(C x ) u(x) for all x 2 X, then P(A) P(A) for all A (by Theorem 3.4.1 of 42]).
For any nonempty A , because P A satis es the condition in (c), it follows that P A (A) P(A). Now P A (A) = (a)Q A (A) + 1 ? (a)]Q (A) = (a) + 1 ? (a)]Q (A). If a < sup then Q (A) = 0 so that P A (A) = (a), and this holds also when a = sup since then (a) = 1 by assumption 3. This establishes that P(A) (a) = (sup A).
To show that P (A) (sup A), note that this holds when sup A = 1 since (1) = 1 and P(A) 1 by coherence of P . Suppose that a = sup A is nite. If z 2 X and z a then A C a C z , so that P(A) P (C z ) u(z), using (b) and monotonicity of the natural extension P, which follows from (a). Hence P(A) inffu(z): z 2 X; z ag = (a); this holds also when fu(z): z 2 X; z ag is empty because then (a) = 1. Thus P(A) (sup A), and together with the earlier inequality this proves that P (A) = (sup A) for every nonempty A .
It follows immediately that is the upper cdf for P , since sup C x = x so that P(C x ) = (sup C x ) = (x) for all x 2 R. When x 2 X, P (C x ) = (x) = u(x) by assumption 2. Thus the upper probability assessments fu(x): x 2 Xg are the restriction of the coherent upper probability measure P to fC x : x 2 Xg, and therefore they are coherent.
To prove that P is maxitive, let A and B be any nonempty subsets of . (The result is trivial if either set is empty.) Let a = sup A and b = sup B. Then sup(A B) = maxfa; bg, and P(A B) = (maxfa; bg) by the previous result. Because is a nondecreasing function, P(A B) = (maxfa; bg) = maxf (a); (b)g = maxfP(A); P(B)g. Thus P is maxitive.
Conditions 1{3 in Theorem 1 are su cient for the upper probability assessments fu(x): x 2 Xg to be coherent. They are also necessary for the coherence of these assessments, since coherent upper probability assessments take values between 0 and 1, are monotone under set inclusion, and take the value 1 at the set ; see Section 2.7.4 of 42]. Theorem 1 tells us that if the assessments satisfy the coherence conditions 1{3 then they produce an upper probability measure P on that is maxitive. It has been shown by Nguyen et al. 32 ] that maxitive upper probability measures are always completely alternating.
Every possibility measure is maxitive, but not every maxitive upper probability measure is a possibility measure. We now consider the additional regularity conditions that must be imposed on the assessments to guarantee that they generate a possibility measure. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, P(A) = (sup A) for every nonempty A , and therefore P(f g) = ( ) for all 2 . To be a possibility measure, P must satisfy P (A) = supfP(f g): 2 Ag, 14 The existence of a probability measure QA with these properties follows from results in Sections 2.9.8 and 3.6.5 of 42].
i.e. (sup A) = supf ( ): 2 Ag for all nonempty A . Necessary and su cient conditions for this, which are stated as assumptions 4 and 5 in the following theorem, are that the upper cdf should be left-continuous everywhere on R and also at 1. Theorem 2. Suppose that u(x), the upper probability of the set f 2 : xg, is assessed for all values x in X, where X . De ne a nondecreasing function for all real numbers x by (x) = inffu(z): z 2 X; z xg provided that the in mum is over a nonempty set and otherwise necessary) for to be left-continuous everywhere on R is that: if x 1 , x 2 , : : : is a sequence in X which converges from below to a real number z, then z 2 X and u(x n ) ! u(z) as n ! 1.
Thus it is su cient for left-continuity of that X is closed from above and that u is leftcontinuous on X. In the more general case of a monotonic predicate q, su cient conditions are that the set of measurements at which upper probabilities are assessed, f q ( ): 2 g, is closed from above, and the upper probability assessments P(L q ( )) are left-continuous as a function of the measurements q ( ). These conditions hold automatically when only nitely many assessments are made.
Here is an example for which the left-continuity assumption fails, but the other assumptions of Theorem 2 are satis ed.
Example 2. Let X be the open interval (0; 1) and take the upper probability assessments to be u(x) = 0 for all x in X. Because all the assumptions of Theorem 1 are satis ed, the natural extension of the assessments satis es P (X ) = (sup X) = (1) = 1. Since P(fxg) = (x) = u(x) = 0 for all x 2 X, P is not a possibility measure. Here the assessments u(x) are continuous but X is not closed from above, and the function is not left-continuous at 1. We can modify this example by including 1 in X and taking u(1) = 1. Now X is closed from above but u(x) is not left-continuous at x = 1. However is unchanged so the natural extension P is still not a possibility measure.
The type of discontinuity seen in the preceding example seems to occur in some practical examples of linguistic uncertainty. Consider, for example, the linguistic information`the rainfall last month at this site was extremely low'. Here`extremely low' is a decreasing predicate for the amount of rainfall, but it suggests that there may well have been zero rainfall, at least in the many parts of Australia that are subject to drought. So it may be reasonable for the nonincreasing function to satisfy (0) = 1 but (x) 0:9 whenever x > 0. Then is not right-continuous at 0, which corresponds to a left-discontinuity for an increasing predicate. The resulting upper probability measure is not a possibility measure.
